The introduction of Medicare in 1965 was the single largest change in health insurance coverage in U.S. history. Many economists and commentators have conjectured that the introduction of Medicare may have also been an important impetus for the development of new drugs that are now commonly used by the elderly and have substantially extended their life expectancy. In this paper, we investigate whether Medicare induced pharmaceutical innovations directed towards the elderly.
I. Introduction
The introduction of Medicare in 1965 was the single largest change in health insurance coverage in U.S. history. Providing nearly universal public health insurance coverage for the elderly, it is currently one of the largest health insurance programs in the world (Newhouse, 2002) . Its introduction had dramatic e!ects on health insurance coverage and health care utilization for the elderly (Cook et al., 2005 , Dow 2002 , Finkelstein, 2005 .
Since the introduction of Medicare, there has also been dramatic progress in the development of new pharmaceuticals. For example, Cutler and Kadiyala (2003) estimate that the development of new pharmaceuticals was responsible for about one-third of the pronounced decline in cardio-vascular disease mortality over the last-half century. Many economists have conjectured that Medicare provided part of the impetus for the development of new drugs, especially those most commonly used by the elderly (e.g., Lichtenberg, 2004 , Cutler, 2004 . However, there has been little systematic analysis of this hypothesis.
An impact of Medicare on pharmaceutical innovation would be consistent with recent empirical evidence of induced innovation in pharmaceuticals more generally. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Finkelstein (2004) , for example, nd that increases in expected demand for certain types of pharmaceuticals are associated with increases in clinical trials and FDA approvals for these products. Such an impact on innovation could also have implications for the cost of the new Medicare prescription drug benet.
For Medicare to induce innovation in new pharmaceuticals, a necessary (but not su"cient) condition is for it to have increased the demand for prescription drugs among the elderly. Although prior to 2006 Medicare did not cover prescription drugs, it may have indirectly increased demand for prescription drugs since it covered physician care, which may be highly complementary with prescription drug use. In addition, any increase in pharmaceutical demand among the elderly caused by Medicare would have to be large enough to induce a change in the direction of technological change in this sector.
In this paper, we investigate the e!ect of Medicare on development of new pharmaceuticals for the elderly. Our strategy follows the logical steps laid out in the previous paragraph. In Section II, we look for an e!ect of Medicare on the demand for pharmaceuticals by the elderly. In Section III, we look for a change in the direction of pharmaceutical innovation after the introduction of Medicare.
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Our investigation provides no support for the conjecture that Medicare had a large e!ect on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation. We nd no evidence that the introduction of Medicare is associated with an increase in drug consumption among the elderly.
Consistent with this, we also nd no evidence of an increase in approvals of new drugs that are more likely to be for diseases of the elderly after Medicare's introduction. Although data quality issues suggest some caution in interpreting the evidence, our reading is that there is no compelling case that Medicare induced signicant pharmaceutical innovation.
II. The Impact of Medicare on Drug Spending
To investigate the impact of Medicare on demand for pharmaceuticals, we compare changes in drug spending for those aged 55-64 (interpreted as the control group not covered by the Medicare and referred to as the "nonelderly") to changes for elderly individuals Our basic estimating equation is a simple di!erences-in-di!erences equation of the form:
where ! !"# denotes prescription drug spending (in 2000 dollars) by individual , in age group -and year .; the " # 's denote a full set of time (survey) dummies; the # " 's denote a full set of age dummies; X !"# is a vector of covariates (specically, dummies for male, married, and three education categories). Finally % &'( # is a dummy indicating the introduction of Medicare, thus taking the value of 1 after 1965, and ) !"# is a dummy variable for whether the individual is in the 65-74 age category and thus covered by Medicare. The coe"cient of interest, $, measures the di!erential change in drug spending by the elderly after the introduction of Medicare. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the same specication expanding the "control group"
to include younger individuals (ages 35-64), and the "treatment group" to include older indivdiuals (ages 65-84). They again indicate that there was no increase in the prescription drug expenditures of the elderly following the introduction of Medicare.
This evidence suggests that the necessary "rst stage" for an induced innovation e!ect-namely an increase in expected market size-may not be present. However, at the time of Medicare's introduction, there was little in the way of e!ective pharmaceuticals for the major chronic illnesses of the elderly (e.g., Cutler and Kadiyala, 2003) . It is therefore possible that pharmaceutical companies may have responded to the expected increases in demand that would occur if they produced new, more e!ective drugs for the newly-insured elderly.
To investigate this possibility, we looked at whether prescription drug spending for the elderly relative to the non-elderly increased with a lag after the introduction of Medicare.
Columns 5 in 6 estimate the analogous specication to columns 1 and 2, but using data from 1963, 1970 and 1977 . The estimate of $ remains negative and similar in magnitude to the estimates using only the 1963 and 1970 survey. Columns 7 and 8 add the 1987 survey. The estimate is once again insignicant and negative, but is now much closer to zero. Finally, if we modify (1) by replacing the = 1970, 1977 and 1987, then, $ 1987 is the only one of these three coe"cients that is positive; all are statisitcally insignicant. 
III. The Impact of Medicare on Pharmaceutical Innovation
We next examine whether drugs approved after the introduction of Medicare are for diseases that are more disproportionately concentrated in the elderly than drugs approved prior to Medicare's introduction. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) We measure /' $ using 1996-1998 data from the Medical Expenditure Survey (MEPS). 4 We compute this variable as the ratio of total prescription drug spending by individuals aged 65 and older on therapeutic class 0 to total prescription drug spending for all ages in the same therapeutic class. The average of /' $ is 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.21. Anticoagulants (/' $ = 0169) are an example of a therapeutic category with a very 3 Our 33 drug classes are relatively broad. For example, cardiac drugs are all one class. Since the elderly share is unlikely to vary within these more aggregated groupings, it is unlikely that we lose much power from not having a ner graduation of drug categories. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) provide a complete list of the 33 classes. 4 Measuring !" ! in 1996-1998 is a central limitation of our empirical strategy. Ideally, we would measure !" ! before Medicare's introduction. Unfortunately, data on drug use by age and therapeutic category do not exist from this time period. To the extent that there have been substantial changes in the !" ! over time, there will be downward attenuation bias in our estimates. Somewhat reassuringly, data from the National Ambulatory Care Survey (NAMCS) indicate that the age distribution of drug use is fairly similar between 1980 and 2000 (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004) .
In general, we prefer the MEPS since the NAMCS is a nonrepresentative sample (only covering drugs prescribed by doctors in private practice), has a smaller sample size, and only provides information on the number of drugs consumed (rather than drug spending) in a given therapeutic class. However, all of our results remain essentially unchanged if we instead use data on the number of drugs used by age group from the 1980-1981 NAMCS to construct !" ! (see Table 3 below).
high elderly share, while antibiotics (/' $ = 0115) are an example with a very low elderly share.
Because of our dependent variable is a count (of new drugs or new molecular entities), we estimate a conditional xed e!ect Poisson model. We assume the following conditional mean function for 2 $# , which denotes the number of new drug approvals (or new molecular entities) in therapeutic category 0 in year .:
where # $ 's denote therapeutic category xed e!ects, " # 's denote year e!ects, 3 $# is log potential market size for therapeutic category 0, and3 $ denotes the mean of 3 $# for category 0 over the sample period. 5 The variables of interest are the interaction between year dummies and /' $ ; this is parameterized exibly, with a di!erent coe"cient $ # for every year ..
We follow Jerry A. Hausman et al. (1984) , and estimate the conditional logit transformation of equation (2):
which factors out the xed e!ects, the # $ 's, and can be estimated consistently with quasimaximum likelihood (Wooldridge, 1999) .
If Medicare had an e!ect on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation, we would expect $ # 's to be positive at some point after 1965. The exact timing of the expected e!ect will depend on delays in the research and approval process. Delays of about 10 years, or even more, may well be plausible (DiMasi et al., 1991 Finkelstein, 2004 .
Figures 1 and 2 show the pattern of $ # 's for total new drug approvals and new molecular entities respectively. The gures make it clear that there is no statistically or economically signicant change towards elderly therapeutic categories following Medicare, even when we look 10 or more years out to allow for a possibly lagged induced innovation e!ect. Table 2 reports the corresponding regression results from the estimation of (3). The rst three columns report results for total drug approvals, while the next three columns are for new molecular entities.We report results with and without controlling for log potential market size. Finally, the last two columns estimate the log linear xed e!ects model of Pakes and Griliches (1980) , which may be easier to interpret than the conditional xed e!ects Poisson model (though it is not consistent). This estimation method treats 2 $# = 0 as 2 $# = 1, and uses log 2 $# on the left-hand side, and includes a dummy on the right-hand side when 2 $# = 0.
In all cases, to make the results easier to depict and interpret, the full set of year Table 2 . These results suggest that whether we measure elderly share in the mid to late 1990s or somewhat earlier (particularly using 1980s data from the NAMCS) has little e!ect on our results.
However, as discussed above, the use of spending patterns in the 1960s may have been substantially di!erent than those captured by our measures of /' $ and /' 0 $ , in which case there may be signicant measurement error in our key right-hand side variable, biasing the coe"cients of interest, the $ # 's, towards zero. Nevertheless, the fact that our analysis in the previous section did not show much of an increase in drug spending of the elderly following Medicare makes us believe that the main reason for the absence of signicant e!ect in Tables 2 and 3 is not data quality, but a lack of a signicant e!ect on Medicare on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation.
Another potential limitation to our results is that we do not allow for di!erential income e!ects by drug class. If drugs that are less utilized by the elderly are also more income elastic, incentives to develop them may have increased over time as incomes have risen.
Finally, while our estimates suggest that Medicare did not a!ect the development of new drugs for the elderly on average, they do not rule out the possibility that Medicare might have had a disproportionate e!ect on the relatively more important new drugs, for example, new anti-hypertensives drugs that have been important in reducing cardiovascular disease mortality (e.g., Cutler and Kadiyala, 2003) . Although we cannot test the impact of Medicare on the development of new anti-hypertensives per se, Cook et al. (2005) nd no evidence that the introduction of Medicare was associated with an increase in medication use for high blood pressure among the elderly with hypertension, which does not support an induced innovation e!ect of Medicare on anti-hypertensives either.
IV. Conclusion
We found no evidence of an e!ect of Medicare on new innovation for pharmaceuticals for the elderly. Although this might appear to contradict ndings by Finkelstein (2004) and Acemoglu and Linn (2004) concerning the e!ect of (potential) market size on pharmaceutical innovation, our interpretation, conrmed by the empirical results in Section III, is that there is no "rst stage" of Medicare increasing the market size of drugs used by the elderly. Medicare covered hospital and doctor expenses but not pharmaceuticals, 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year Notes: The graph is constructed similarly to Figure 1 , except that the dependent variable is approvals of new molecular entities. 
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